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Why Teach International Family Law
in Conflicts?
William L. Reynolds*
ABSTRACT

Professor Reynolds sets forth a challenge to conflicts
professors: to teach internationalfamily law in their conflict of
laws classes. At present, many conflicts professors avoid
teaching internationalfamily law, in part because the study
of this subject is complicated by several statutes addressing
particularlydifficult issues. Ignoring internationalfamily law
is unwise, because many United States citizens and lawyers
are likely to confront such problems.
Moreover, this Article suggests several additional
reasonsfor including internationalfamily law in the general
conflicts course. First, litigants entangled in divorce and
custody proceedings with international complications face
high financial and emotional costs; knowing how to assist a
client embroiled in such a matter is therefore important.
Second, the topic of international family law provides
considerable material beyond the reach of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the United States Constitution; as such, this
topic regularly raises questions regardingthe enforcement of
judgments from foreign countries. Third, the topic raises
innumerable cross-culturalquestions that require students to
examine United States policy. Fourth, this cross-cultural
nature of internationalfamily law exposes students to other
cultures and to writings of non-conflicts scholars. This
interdisciplinaryperspective on conflicts 'solutions" raises
fundamental questions about the scholarship on conflict of
laws. Finally, internationalfamily law provides interesting
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School of Law. This paper is an expanded version of a speech given at the 1995
meeting of the American Association of Law Schools Section on Conflict of Laws.
My thanks to Nancy Fink and Bill Richman for reading an earlier draft. This
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material for reviewing an array of conflicts issues. Thus,
ProfessorReynolds invites conflicts professors to tap the vast
unmined vein of internationalfamily law to improve their
conflicts courses.
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I. WHY TEACH INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS MATERIALS?

The conflicts course has been hidebound for many years.
The basic troika of jurisdiction, choice of law, and judgments gets
covered well enough, but the overwhelming emphasis is on United
States law. Both the conflicts casebook and the professor usually
give only a passing reference to international problems.
That chauvinism is unwise in today's world. No longer is
international litigation conducted only by Wall Street mega-firms;
practitioners everywhere and anywhere may find themselves
immersed in the intricacies of taking a deposition in Belgium,
applying Korean contract law in a Maryland state court, or
enforcing a Greek judgment in a federal court in Tennessee.
Unfortunately, few schools offer, and even fewer wannabe
litigators take, specialized courses in international litigation. Law
professors do their students a disservice if they do not expose
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them to international materials in conflicts, the most likely
general course for exposure to this topic.
International conflicts materials also provide a valuable
contrast to the way things are done in the United States. We

American conflicts scholars are a particularly parochial lot;
obsessed with fascinating trivia such as what Brainerd Currie

really meant, American conflicts scholars focus on their own
narrow view of the world. The rest of the world, the Europeans in
particular, have been dealing with these problems for centuries.
It is possible that American conflict scholars can learn something
from them.' It is time to teach how other societies handle the
problems that cross sovereign boundaries.
II. WHY TEACH FAMILY LAW?

I have been astonished-and horrified-to learn in recent
years that many conflicts professors do not teach the family law
section of their conflicts casebook. 2 That lacuna astonishes me
because family law issues raise enormously important (and
interesting) public policy questions. For example, must a court
have personal jurisdiction over both parents before it can enter a
custody decree entitled to full faith and credit?3 Family law
conflicts issues are even more fun because they often involve
areas considered well settled. Family law matters also provide a
remarkably good review of issues covered in the jurisdiction and
judgments parts of the course. For example, is the minimum
contacts test satisfied when a state asserts personal jurisdiction
over a man whose only contact with the forum is that the act of
conception occurred (or may have occurred) there?
I am horrified that family law issues are not taught more
widely in conflicts courses because this area is the one where

1.

Conflicts parochialism is particularly puzzling given the rich and

sophisticated history of conflicts jurisprudence among the Dutch and the Italian
city states.
2.
If they don't teach family and international matters, how do they fill up
three credits? Jurisdiction does not take very long because it is a reprise of first
year civil procedure, and full faith and credit has long been settled law. That
leaves choice of law, and how long can one really spend exploring the mysteries of
the true conflict and the gospel according to St. Brainerd? Surely conflicts
courses are not being filled out by learned discussions about multi-state estate
planning or the pseudo-corporation doctrine.
See DAVID VERNON ET"AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
3.
PROBLEMS 732-36 (1990).
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most American litigants and their lawyers are likely to encounter
the insanities produced by our federal system of judicial
government. The policy-makers that are trained in law school
should be familiar with family law issues and their horrible

consequences for United States citizens, especially the poor.
Professors are also policy-makers, and obviously should be aware
of these issues as well. Moreover, many litigators will encounter
family law matters in practice, which means that they will also
Professors should
encounter interstate family law matters.
litigators
for
this
possibility.
Finally,
family law is
prepare future
one of the only areas in conflicts in which statutory solutions are
important. It is useful for law students to study how legislative
bodies have reacted to these complex problems.
Unfortunately, these legislative solutions are a primary
reason why conflicts professors skip family law. Three major
statutes must be mastered: the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act (URESA),4 Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA), and the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act
(UIFSA).s The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) should
7
also be studied. 6 Academics just do not like complex statutes
and, as a result, often avoid teaching these family law statutes in
conflicts courses.

III. WHY TEACH INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAw?
Because family and international law issues are very
important, international family law issues should be taught in
conflicts courses. To elaborate, international family law should be

4.

UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT, 9B U.L.A. 553 (1958)

[hereinafter URESA].

An amended and widely adopted version of URESA can be

found at REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT, 9B U.L.A. 381

(1968) [hereinafter RURESA]. See generally INTERSTATE CHILD SUPPORT REMEDIES
(Margaret C. Haynes & G. Diane Dodson eds., 1989).
5.

UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 115 (1968) [hereinafter

UCCJA]. There is good news for the statute-phobic professor-the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT, 9 U.L.A. 121
pocket part (1992) [hereinafter UIFSA]. Because so many states have adopted
UIFSA, URESA really does not need to be taught anymore.
An excellent
description and analysis of UIFSA can be found in John J. Sampson, Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act (With Unofficial Annotations), 27 FAM. L.Q. 93 (1993)
(Professor Sampson was a co-reporter of UIFSA).
6.
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1980).
7.
Except for the tax professors-but they're probably not regarded as
real academics anyway precisely because they focus on a code.
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taught because the issues are important, liberating, crosscultural, and just plain fun.
A. It's Important
Family law disputes often do not seem interesting. To some,
they lack the high drama of products liability cases. Family law
matters can be very important, however. For example, unpaid
child support obligations in the United States amount to many
billions of dollars. The burden of the system's failure falls
overwhelmingly on the poor and the helpless.
The importance of family law litigation skyrockets when the
disputing parties cross national boundaries. The extraordinary
expenses of international litigation-both in terms of travel and
counsel fees-make it imperative that the court get it right the
first time. There is no room for error; the parties do not have the
resources to try again.
Avoiding error is primarily the responsibility of the lawyers
and judges. Nevertheless, the training they (and their assistants)
receive in law school classes can play a vital role in that endeavor.
Teaching international family law, therefore, can help reduce,
albeit in a small way, the sum of human misery.
B. It's Liberating
International family law brings to the classroom problems
that are free from the constraints imposed by the United States
Constitution. This may be most noticeable when questions arise
concerning recognition of judgments from foreign countries. The
Full Faith and Credit Clause has taken almost all of the mystery
out of those questions in United States litigation.8
Getting a
judgment from a foreign country recognized is a different matter,
however.
Divorce law provides an excellent example of this
phenomenon.
For half a century it has been well settled that recognition
must be given to a divorce rendered by a court in the United

States with subject matter jurisdiction, that is, by a court in a
state where one of the parties is domiciled. 9 Because domicile in
this context has become virtually meaningless as anything other

8.
See generally William L. Reynolds, The Iron Law of Full Faithand Credit,
53 MD. L. REV. 412 (1994).
9.
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
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divorces" have
than a technical pleading requirement,1 0 "suitcase
11
law.
family
States
United
of
fact
a
been
long
The issues are not so clear, however, when the divorce is
anything other than a divorce rendered in the United States. It is
quite obvious that many courts in this country maintain their
traditional hostility toward divorces granted to United States
citizens by foreign tribunals. Freed from the shackles of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, American state courts became quite
Victorian in their reactions to divorce. This reaction provokes
fascinating discussion.
The distinction between "quickie" American divorces and
"quickie" foreign divorces raises fundamental jurisprudential
concerns in a context that facilitates good class discussion. Why
should a Dominican Republic divorce be treated with less respect
than one rendered in Delaware? Why should a state not extend
comity to a foreign divorce? Should a state distinguish between
foreign unilateral and bilateral divorces? 12 If public policy is the
answer, what are the sources of this policy? 13 Why, in other
words, should a foreign divorce be harder to enforce successfully
than a domestic divorce? Would the result be different if the
Dominican Republic were a rich and industrialized member of the
"Group of Seven"? Many of these issues arise in the context of
be treated
the "Incidental Question"; should those issues
14
differently? These are fun problems to explore.

10.
See, e.g., Rymanowskd v. Rymanowstd, 249 A.2d 407 (R.I. 1969)
(person challenging foreign divorce bears heavy burden of proof). See generally
E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Recognition as to Marital Status of Foreign Divorce
Decree Attacked on Ground of Lack of Domicile, Since Williams Decision, 28
A.L.R.2d 1303 (1953).

11.
See generally David Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws, 34
U. CHIl. L. REV. 26 (1967)
12.
The question here is whether a consenting respondent can waive, by
his or her conduct, the requirement of domicile. The case law gives this question
short shrift. But see Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953) (Hastie, J.,
dissenting), vacated as moot, 347 U.S. 610 (1954).
A great discussion vehicle is Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 209 N.E. 2d 709
13.
(N.Y. 1965), a rare case bucking the trend, in which the court ignored clear
evidence of domestic policy in order to recognize a foreign divorce. The discussion
of policy in the non-recognition cases is almost always non-existent. See, e.g.,
Estate of Stepke, 222 N.W. 2d 628 (Wis. 1974).
14.
Choice of law in divorce recognition is another interesting topic. See,
e.g., Succession of Cohen, 480 So.2d 1059 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985); Rosen v.
Sitner, 418 A.2d 490 (Pa. Super. 1980). Other fascinating issues include the
availability of forum non conveniens in divorce, e.g., Jagger v. Superior Court, 96
Cal. App. 3d 579, 158 Cal. Rptr. 163 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); and whether a state
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Equally intriguing are questions involving aliens who are
American domiciliaries and who wish to obtain a divorce in a
United States court. Should the United States court entertain the
action? Should it dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds? Is
there any real difference between these cases and cases in which
the petitioner is only technically domiciled in the forum?
C. It's Cross-Cultural
A third reason to teach international family law is that it
offers students a different perspective. Students and professors
are exposed to different ways of doing things, ways that are
strange and fun. Custody provides a good example.
United States custody law at one time was characterized by
great judicial discretion that often took the form of hostility to
custody decisions made elsewhere. Now, a sophisticated and
well-elaborated statutory scheme, the UCCJA, controls interstate
custody matters. s The UCCJA combines rules, discretion, and
strong deference to the first court to obtain subject matter
jurisdiction. 16
International custody matters are governed by what is
commonly known as the Hague Convention on International Child
Abduction (Hague Convention). 17 The Convention takes a nondiscretionary approach to enforcement: an outstanding custody
order must be honored. One familiar with the history of child
custody litigation in the United States might wonder how
parochial United States courts will be in interpreting this strong
mandate. How readily, in other words, will the few loopholes in
this Convention be exploited to further the interests of United
States parents? Will United States courts be as willing to return

can divorce a resident alien, e.g., Abou-Issa v. Abou-Issa, 189 S.E. 2d 443 (Ga.
1974).
15.
See UCCJA, supranote 5.
16.
Id.
17.
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, 19 I.L.M. 1501 (1980). This Convention has been ratified by more
than thirty states including the United States. The U.S. Congress' implementing
legislation is found at International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
11601 et seq. (1989) [hereinafter ICARA]. See generally Linda J. Silberman,
Hague Convention on InternationalChild Abduction: A Brief Overview and Case Law
Analysis, 28 FAM. L.Q. 9 (1994); Carol S. Bruch, The Central Authority's Role
Under the Hague Child Abduction Convention: A Friend in Deed, 28 FAM. L.Q. 35
(1994).
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a child raised in the United States to Hungary as they would be to
return a Hungarian child?
Many other fascinating questions can be raised. What effect
does the Hague Convention have, for example, when a separate
custody action is brought in the United States following a custody
determination by a foreign court? Can a United States court
exercise jurisdiction regarding the removal of a child from a
foreign state? Or does the foreign decision "preempt" the exercise
of jurisdiction by all United States courts?1 8 Can a child be
wrongfully removed from one state if the removal occurs before
the courts of that state have acquired jurisdiction over the case? 19
What will happen when the existing custody order requires
sending the child to a state that customarily denies due process
or engages in practices that United States courts would deem
abhorrent? What happens, as Linda Silberman writes, when the
child will be returned to a lesbian couple in Denmark? 20 Or, as
more states ratify the Convention, what if the child will be sent to
a state where he or she will work full time as a rug weaver
beginning at age eight?2 1
D. It EnablesLaw Students to See Things
From a Different Perspective
The cross-cultural rewards of international family law do not
require a literal border crossing; the subject also provides an
illuminating insight into our own culture.

Teaching international family law often leads to reading texts
written by non-conflicts scholars.
Their comments on the
collective efforts of conflicts scholars can be quite scathing. The
leading textbook on family law, for example, makes this statement
in a discussion about the recognition of foreign state divorces:
"The cases recognizing these bilateral migratory divorces have
been heavily criticized by scholars of the conflict of laws.
Criticism may be justified from the viewpoint of conflict of laws

18.
For one court's answer, see L.H. v. Youth Welfare Office of Wiesbaden,
Germany, 568 N.Y.S. 2d 852 (Faro. Ct. 1991) (prior German ruling did not
foreclose New York court from hearing cases; nevertheless, court found that it
lacked jurisdiction under the UCCJA).
19.
See Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396 (6th Cir. 1993) (removal is
wrongful if the first state is the "habitual residence" of the child under the Hague
Convention).
20.
See Silberman, supranote 17, at 32.
21.
See generally id. at 31-34 (discussing similar hypotheticals).
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theory, whatever that may be, but there is a more important
consideration... ."22 The closed world of conflicts scholars can
be too self-congratulatory at times; it is useful to see conflicts as
other do.
E. For The Fun Of It
Wild and wacky problems are sometimes encountered in
international family law. What is one to make of Dalig Singh Bir
and his multiple wives? 2 3 Similarly, how does one comprehend
a First
the spectacle of United States courts recognizing, without
24
Amendment shiver, divorces made by a rabbinical court?
One sideshow involves the treaties entered into by the
sovereign state of California with a number of foreign
governments. California entered into these treaties with the tacit
encouragement of the federal government, even though the spirit,
and probably the language, of the United States Constitution
forbids an "agreement" between a state and a "foreign power"
without congressional consent.25 California and other states have
been driven to this extra-constitutional expedient by the
disgraceful refusal of the federal government to address the
terrible difficulties the United States federal system of governance
imposes on the collection of child support across state and
international borders. 26 The story is fascinating to tell in class
(it's certainly a lot more fun than another guest statute case or
yet another hypothetical about long-arm jurisdiction), and it
addresses an increasingly common and vital subject.
Finally, consider the prospect of a Hague Convention on
This prospect raises a variety of
Inter-Country Adoption.
interesting issues for discussion 2 7 involving basic policy. One
proposed rule would permit the mother's consent, but only after

22.

HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMES=C RELATIONS IN THE UNITED

STATES 433 (2d ed. 1988) (emphasis added).
See Estate of Bir, 188 P.2d 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948).
23.
See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 128 N.Y.S. 787 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1911).
24.
The story is well told in Gloria Folger DeHart, Comity, Conventions, and
25.
the Constitution: State and FederalInitiatives in InternationalSupport Enforcement,
28 FAM. L.Q. 89 (1994). Ms. DeHart is the genius behind this concept.

The situation is improving somewhat. See id. at 105-08. However, we
26.
still have a long way to go.
Hague Convention on Co-Operation in Respect of Intercountry
27.

Adoption, final act May 29, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1134 (1993). Consent may not be
"induced by payment or compensation of any kind." Id. ch. II, art. 4(c)(4).
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birth.2 8 How will this affect litigation in United States courts
involving adoption made before the Convention, or involving a
child from a non-signatory state?
One additional subject area that creates fascinating
classroom discussion involves tribal courts. United States law
accords Native American tribal courts a form of "sovereign"
status.2 9 This means, among other things, that decisions of tribal
courts are entitled to full preclusive effect in other courts of the
United States.3 0 The interaction among tribal, state, and federal
courts is a fascinating and virtually unexplored area of
"international" law. Because of the large number of people
involved, conflicting assertions of jurisdiction between tribal and
state courts are a headache in family law. Unfortunately, this
problem is3 rarely explored in either academic literature or the
classroom.
IV. A PEDAGOGIC CONCLUSION

Conflicts courses need to expose students to serious
discussion of both international and family law. These issues are
important, interesting, and provide a new perspective from which
to examine the assumptions of United States conflicts laws.
Better yet, this subject area offers terrific teaching material.
Students really like these topics and they provide a particularly
useful review at the end of the semester. Because they are so
much fun, topics in international family law are really good for a
class afflicted with end of the semester blues. So, go forth into
the classroom and teach international family law; your students
and your evaluations will benefit.

28.

See generally Peter H. Pfund, Inter-Country Adoption: The 1993 Hague

Convention: Its PUrpose, Implementation, and Promise, 28 FAM. L.Q. 53 (1994).
29.
See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). See
also June Melvin Mickens, Interaction Between State and Tribal Child Support

Systems, 6 AM. J. FAM. L. 185 (1992).
30.

Assuming, of course, that the requisite jurisdictional findings have

been made.
31.
The American Bar Association has recently sponsored a set of model
treaties concerning child support to be entered into by state and tribal
governments. For a brief discussion of the recognition problems created by Native
American divorces, see CLARK, supranote 22, at 420-2 1.

